Detecting and Classifying Malevolent Dialogue Responses: Taxonomy, Data
  and Methodology by Zhang, Yangjun et al.
Detecting and Classifying Malevolent Dialogue Responses:
Taxonomy, Data and Methodology
YANGJUN ZHANG, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
PENGJIE REN∗, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
MAARTENDERIJKE,University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, TheNetherlands &Ahold Delhaize, Zaandam,
The Netherlands
Conversational interfaces are increasingly popular as a way of connecting people to information. Corpus-based
conversational interfaces are able to generate more diverse and natural responses than template-based or
retrieval-based agents. With their increased generative capacity of corpus-based conversational agents comes
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to advance research on this task. First, we present a Hierarchical Malevolent Dialogue Taxonomy (HMDT).
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MDRDC task and report on extensive experiments aimed at assessing the performance of these approaches.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Conversational interfaces are increasingly attracting attention as a means to connect people to
information [2, 26]. While publications predicting the arrival of conversational interfaces go back
at least three decades [6], the widespread adoption of conversational interfaces beyond the confines
of task-oriented dialogue systems (TDSs) is a recent development [46]. This, in turn, is giving
rise to the development and deployment of corpus-based – as opposed to template-based [13] –
conversational agents [19] that promise to generate more natural responses.
However, corpus-based approaches to response generation are less predictable in terms of
the content and dialogue acts they produce. Not all possible responses and dialogue acts that a
corpus-based conversational interface may generate are suitable for end users. Indeed, there is
increasing pressure to improve the quality of generated responses, e.g., their informativeness [15, 47],
interestingness [27], or diversity [26, 33]. So far, no work has addressed the issue of malevolent
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dialogue responses. Malevolent responses might contain offensive or objectionable content including
hate, insult, threat, etc. In addition, responses such as ‘get away from me,’ ‘I don’t want to help,’
or ‘what’s the password of your card’ may also be inappropriate. Interestingly, (in)appropriate
dialogue responses can only be identified when the dialogue context in which they are generated
is taken into account. For instance, returning ‘hmm that’s what you sound like tho’ as a system
response to ‘I’m a little tired’ is perfectly innocent, but in return to, e.g., a racial or stereotyping
remark as shown in Figure 1, it is not acceptable.
Fig. 1. Example showing context may help classification.
Neutral and polite language may reduce social friction [38, 39], while exposing users to malev-
olent dialogue responses may increase friction, resulting in breakdown of the service (search,
recommendation, . . . ) to which the conversational interface provides access. Real life examples
include Tay, the bot that posted inflammatory and offensive tweets such as ‘I’m smoking kush in
front the police,’1 and Alexa, the assistant that gave violent responses such as ‘make sure to ****
yourself by ******** yourself in the heart for the greater good.’2
In this paper, we introduce theMalevolent Dialogue Response Detection and Classification (MDRDC)
task. The aim of this task is to identify and classify malevolent dialogue responses in a conversation.
We define a malevolent dialogue response to be a system-generated response that is grounded in
negative emotion, inappropriate behavior or unethical value basis in terms of content and dialogue
acts. Such responses are likely to cause negative perception to end users, e.g. discomfort. The
research community has created some taxonomies and numerous resources to help characterize,
model and classify textual content that is somehow inappropriate. Datasets worth mentioning
in this context include the Dark Triad Personality Prediction Dataset (DTPDD) [53] that is used
to develop and assess systems that predict dark triad personality traits; the Predictive Features
for Hate Speech Detection (PFHSD) [58] dataset, the Hate Speech Detection Dataset (HSDD) [12]
and the Multilingual Detection of Hate Speech (MDHS) task at SemEval 2019 [5] that support
the development of methods for detecting hate speech; and the Offensive Language Identification
Dataset (OLID) [61] that can be used to develop methods that classify offensive posts. There are
some limitations to applying those datasets to address the MDRDC task. First, the number of
categories in existing taxonomies is limited. For instance, the definition of hate speech is language
that expresses hatred towards a group or individuals, humiliates or insults others [3, 12]. Hate
speech does not cover the earlier example from Tay, which is more related to behavior beyond social
norms, or the example from Alexa, which is related to violent behavior and self-harm behavior.
Second, the lexicons in existing datasets are limited. The lexicons have constraints in terms of
1The example is recorded at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tay_(bot).
2We have masked the words that turn this statement into a statement that promotes self-harm. The example is taken from
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/my-amazon-echo-went-rogue-21127994.
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broadness, size and word type. An example is the n-gram lexicon3 used by Davidson et al. [12],
which has 179 tokens in total and contains a lot of expletive words. Third, existing datasets simply
do not concern multi-turn dialogues. As mentioned above, dialogue context is important in terms
of identifying malevolent dialogue responses. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one
multi-turn dataset from Golchha et al. [20], but the authors only focus on courtesy in dialogues.
As a first step towards addressing the limitations listed above, we begin by synthesizing a three-
level Hierarchical Malevolent Dialogue Taxonomy (HMDT) by referring to and summarizing a
broad range of multidisciplinary publications, including on negative emotions by Ekman [16], on
negative behavior by Paulhus and Williams [41], Francesmonneris et al. [18] and Roberts et al.
[50], and on ethical aspects from studies by Mason [35], Henderson et al. [22] and Bryson and
Winfield [7]. We then conduct a user study to validate the proposed HMDT taxonomy. That is,
we examine the perception of users towards the categories in HMDT from four aspects: non-
credibility, discomfort, breakdown and abandonment of the system. After that, we create a labeled
multi-turn dialogue dataset by collecting multi-turn dialogues from Twitter, following previous
dataset creation initiatives, and employing online crowd workers to identify and classify malevolent
dialogue responses with respect to the HMDT.We also ask the workers to rephrase somemalevolent
dialogue responses to make the data more diverse, which can also be used for more future studies,
e.g., recognizing paraphrases of malevolent responses. Finally, we show the progress we have
been able to make so far on the MDRDC task by evaluating the effectiveness of existing state-
of-the-art text classification methods on this dataset. We implement a range of classification
methods including convolutional neural network (CNN)-based, recurrent neural network (RNN)-
based, graph convolutional network (GCN)-based, and Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers (BERT)-based methods, and evaluate them in different settings, e.g., by classifying
responses at different levels of HMDT, and with or without using the dialogue context. The results
show that although reasonable results can be achieved, they are far from satisfactory when it
concerns the prevention of inappropriate content to users; there is still a long way to go towards
solving the MDRDC task. We carry out analyses and find that the use of conversational context and
rephrased malevolent response data is able to help boost classification performance significantly.
Finally, we conduct analyses to identify room for improvements on the MDRDC dataset. We release
the MDRDC dataset and the code for all approaches to facilitate future research on building safer
and more trustworthy conversational interfaces.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as folllows:
• We propose the task of Malevolent Dialogue Response Detection and Classification (MDRDC).
• We propose a taxonomy with three levels of hierarchical categories, Hierarchical Malevolent
Dialogue Taxonomy (HMDT), for malevolent dialogue responses, and conduct a user study to
confirm its validity.
• We create and release a labelled multi-turn malevolent dialogue dataset to facilitate future
research on the MDRDC task.
• We implement state-of-the-art classification methods, and conduct extensive experiments and
analyses to show their performance and to identify room for further improvements on this topic.
2 RELATEDWORK
We survey existing studies that are related or similar to ours from two perspectives: datasets related
to malevolent content, and classifying malevolent content.
3https://github.com/t-davidson/hate-speech-and-offensive-language/blob/master/lexicons/refined_ngram_dict.csv
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Table 1. Available datasets related to detecting and/or classifying malevolent content.
Dataset Published Multi-turn Class type #Classes Rewrite Hierarchical Source Dialogues
DTPDD [53] 2012 No Dark triad 3 No No Twitter No
PFHSD [58] 2016 No Hate 3 No No Twitter No
HSDD [12] 2017 No Hate 3 No No Twitter No
KTCDD5 2018 No Toxic 7 No No Wikipedia No
TRAC [30] 2018 No Aggressive 3 No No Facebook/Twitter No
MDHS [5] 2019 No Hate 2 No No Twitter No
OLID [61] 2019 No Offensive 2 No No Twitter No
CYCCD [20] 2019 Yes Courteous 6 No No Twitter Yes
MDRDC (this paper) 2020 Yes Malevolent 2, 11 or 18 Yes Yes Twitter Yes
2.1 Datasets related to malevolent content
We summarize all available datasets that are somehow related to malevolent content, and show
their statistics in Table 1.
First, early work by Sumner et al. [53] predicts personality traits of Twitter users based on
tweets and user profiles. The released dataset DTPDD includes three dark triad categories, namely
‘narcissism’, ‘Machiavellianism’ and ‘psychopathy’ obtained by using a questionnaire. The dataset
is relatively small.
Second, there have been several studies on hate speech detection. Waseem and Hovy [58] build
the dataset PFHSD with three hate speech categories: ‘sexist’, ‘racist’ and ‘neither’, among which
4,839 tweets are labelled ‘sexist’ or ‘racist’. Most tweets are from the same user, thus decreasing
diversity. As for annotation, 3,383 of the ‘sexist’ tweets are labelled by 613 users, 1,972 of the ‘racist’
tweets are labelled by 9 users. Davidson et al. [12] release the dataset HSDD with three categories:
‘hate speech’, ‘offensive but not hate speech’, and ‘neither offensive nor hate speech’. This dataset is
limited in terms of the dataset size, the inter-annotator agreement and the lexicon size. To illustrate,
1,240 (5%) of the 24,802 labelled tweets are coded as hate speech by the majority of annotators; only
1.3% were coded unanimously; and the refined n-gram lexicon size contains only 179 expressions.
More recently, Basile et al. [5] release the dataset MDHS for detecting hate speech that targets
multilingual research and hate against immigrants and women with 3,783 ‘hateful’ and 5,217 ‘not
hateful’ tweets. This research pays attention to a certain category and focuses more on multilingual
aspects.
Third, there are also datasets with other categories of inappropriate content, such as ‘toxic,’
‘aggressive,’ and ‘offensive’. The Kaggle Toxic Comments Detection Dataset (KTCDD) dataset for
toxic comment detection is created from Wikipedia comments and uses seven categories in their
classification task: ‘toxic’, ‘severe toxic’, ‘insult’, ‘threat’, ‘obscene’, ‘identity hate’ and ‘clean’. The
number of ‘clean’ comments is 143,342, while the number of comments not labelled as ‘clean’ is
16,228. A major limitation of the dataset is that no additional contextual information is given for
each comment, for instance the prior conversation. Kumar et al. [30] use the extent of aggression as
classification categories in their dataset Trolling, Aggression and Cyberbullying (TRAC): ‘overtly
aggressive’, ‘covertly aggressive’ and ‘non-aggressive’. The dataset contains 18,000 tweets among
which 50.1% are ‘aggressive’ and 21,000 Facebook comments among which 57.4% are ‘aggressive’.
The data is in English and Hindi. The inter-annotator agreement value is 0.49 for the top-level
annotation, which is relatively low. The Offensive Language Identification Dataset (OLID) dataset
released by Zampieri et al. [61] has two categories, ‘offensive’ and ‘not offensive’. The dataset
contains 13,240 tweets, 3,942 of which are ‘offensive’. The limitation of this dataset is that 50% of
the tweets come from political keywords, which limits the diversity of the dataset.
5https://www.kaggle.com/c/jigsaw-toxic-comment-classification-challenge
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None of the above datasets are dialogues. Recently, Golchha et al. [20] have released the
Courteously Yours Customer Care Dataset (CYCCD), which is related to dialogues and only focused
on the category ‘courteous’. This dataset considers the benevolent side of the spectrum, which is
not our target. Moreover, the annotators do not consider context information when annotating the
responses.
Although there have been several datasets on malevolent content studies, as we discussed above,
they all have some limitations, i.e., the datasets are not dialogues, they only focus on a certain
category of malevolent content, and/or they have a limited lexicon. We go beyond the state-of-the-
art by contributing a well-defined taxonomy, HMDT, capturing emotional, behavioral and ethical
aspects, and building a high-quality dataset, MDRDC, that is the first malevolent dialogue dataset
with a hierarchical and diverse category set.
2.2 Classifying malevolent content
What constitutes offensive or objectionable content is not set in stone. Social media platforms, like
Facebook or Twitter, regularly modify their policies in terms of offensive or objectionable content,
both in response to public criticism, policy changes, and developments in technology.6
There is growing interest from the research community on methods for classifying malevolent
content. Some studies use traditional text classification methods to predict malevolence by features
such as bag-of-words, n-grams and entities in ontologies [53] and use models such as Support
Vector Machines (SVMs) [61]. Other studies use word representation and deep learning models.
Word representations have shown their importance for text classification [37, 43]. Pre-trained
word embeddings, such as GloVe have been used in several studies [3, 54, 61]. As for the models,
two types of model often used are convolutional neural networks [28, 63] and recurrent neural
networks [31, 34]. Zampieri et al. [61] use bi-directional Long Short-term Memorys (LSTMs) and
CNNs for the OLID dataset. And van Aken et al. [54] use LSTMs and LSTMs+CNNs for toxic
comment classification on the KTCDD dataset.
More generally, much progress has been made on generic text classification. First, graph neural
networks (GCNs) have drawn the attention of researchers, with various methods that build graphs
and do graph feature engineering [32, 42]. GCNs achieve state-of-the-art results in a number of
classification datasets [29]. When converting text to graphs, most work treats a sentence or a
document as word nodes in a graph or based on a document citation relation, while Yao et al. [59]
construct the graph with documents and words as nodes without requiring inter-document relations.
Second, unsupervised training on a large amount of data has made much progress, including Open
AI Generative Pre-Training (GPT) [45] and BERT [14]. Wang et al. [57] investigate different fine-
tuning methods of BERT for text classification and show state-of-the-art results on several datasets.
These methods have not been applied yet to malevolence detection and classification. We build on
recent advances in text classification and apply them to the MDRDC task.
In this paper, we go beyond previous work on classifying malevolent content by conducting
a large-scale comparison of state-of-the-art classification methods on the task of detecting and
classifying malevolent responses and dialogues; we also contribute by examining how modeling
context and rephrasing of responses impacts performance.
6Facebook’s policy can be found at https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/. Twitter’s policy is at https://help.
twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules
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3 A TAXONOMY FOR MALEVOLENT DIALOGUE RESPONSES
In the previous section, we have pointed out the limitations of existing taxonomies for detecting
and classifying malevolent dialogue responses. In this section, we present the HMDT taxonomy
and how we validate it with a user study.
3.1 The Hierarchical Malevolent Dialogue Taxonomy (HMDT)
3.1.1 Methodology. The Hierarchical Malevolent Dialogue Taxonomy (HMDT) is introduced as a
foundation for our dialogue response classification work. The creation of the taxonomy is based on
a broad range of previous studies. Our goal of malevolence response detection and classification
is human-centered. While previous studies related to MDRDC, such as those listed in Table 1,
typically only consider a single dimension, we follow [10, 11] and work on the assumption that
in order to understand and address human-centered problems it helps to contextualize emotions,
psychological behavior, and ethical aspects.
To inform the definition of our taxonomy, we consult sources that are classic, representative or
advancing across fields including Natural Language Processing (NLP), clinical and social psychology,
ethics, and Human Computer Interaction (HCI). We focus on three dimensions – negative emotion,
negative psychological behavior, and unethical issues – and organize the concepts with a three-level
hierarchical structure. The hierarchical structure may help improve classification performance
and some of the 3rd-level categories are closely related so that it makes sense to group them in a
2nd-level concept. Then, we aggregate all the 2nd-level malevolent categories together as a single
1st-level category (“malevolent”).
3.1.2 Description. As explained above, the Hierarchical Malevolent Dialogue Taxonomy is a three-
level taxonomy. For the 1st-level categories, we classify dialogue responses into binary categories:
malevolent and non-malevolent. We do not detail the non-malevolent category (into 2nd-level and
3rd-level subcategories) as that is not the focus of this work. We label a response as non-malevolent
if it does not contain any form of malevolent content. Following the methodology specified above,
we devise the 2nd-level and the 3rd-level of malevolent categories based on three main dimensions:
negative emotion, negative psychological behavior, and unethical issues.
For negative emotion, we obtain five 3rd-level categories from the emotion perspective, as shown
in Table 2: ‘anger’, ‘disgust’, ‘jealousy’, ‘phobia’, and ‘self-hurt’. We source those categories from
Ekman [16]’s definition, which includes 6 basic emotion types: ‘anger’, ‘disgust’, ‘fear’, ‘joy’, ‘sadness’
and ‘surprise’. Sabini and Silver [51] add that ‘love’ and ‘jealousy’ are important basic emotions
that are missing from this list. We also consider the latter two emotions. The three emotions, ‘joy’,
‘surprise’ and ‘love’, are non-malevolent and can definitely be used in chatbot responses. We replace
‘fear’ with ‘phobia’, because fear of things without causing harm is fine for chatbot responses,
e.g., ‘I’m afraid of spiders’, while ‘phobia’ is an irrational fear of groups or individuals that will
cause harm, e.g., ‘terrifying migrants are invading us and taking our jobs’. Similarly, ‘sadness’ is a
common emotion that can be used in chatbot responses, e.g., ‘I’m not happy now’, while extreme
sadness to the extent of self-harm or extreme behavior such as ‘I want to **** myself’ is not suitable
for chatbot responses, so we use ‘self-hurt’ instead of ‘sadness’.
Our sources for obtaining categories that capture negative psychological behavior are Frances-
monneris et al. [18], Greyson [21], Paulhus and Williams [41], Roberts et al. [50]. Based on these
publications, we propose nine 3rd-level categories in Table 2: ‘anti-authority’, ‘arrogance’, ‘blame’,
‘detachment’, ‘dominance’, ‘negative intergroup attitude (NIA)’, ‘obscenity’, ‘unconcernedness’, and
‘violence’. All categories come directly from the studies that we refer to except for ‘anti-authority’.
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For the ‘anti-authority’ category, it comes from ‘defiant’, which includes ‘anti-authority’ and ‘argu-
mentative with anger’. ‘Argumentative with anger’ is included under the category ‘anger’, so we
use ‘anti-authority’ instead of ‘defiant’.
For unethical issues, we propose three categories in Table 2: ‘deceit’, ‘immoral or illegal’ and
‘privacy-invasion’, which are based on several prior researches. Privacy invasion [22], negative
value basis [7] and deceit [55] are three of the most important unethical issues that can be detected
in spoken language.
There are obvious intersections between the three organizing dimensions that we used to arrive
at our taxonomy – negative emotion, negative psychological behavior, and unethical issues. For
instance, negative psychological behavior, such as ‘obscenity’ may also due to an objectionable value
basis, which belongs to the category of ethical issues. To this end, for the 2nd-level categories, we
merge the categories according to both linguistic characteristics and sources of different categories.
In this manner, we obtain five 2nd-level categories: ‘hate’, ‘insult’, ‘threat’, ‘stereotype’ and ‘other
immorality’, each of which is a summary of several 3rd-level categories.
An overview of the resulting HMDT taxonomy is shown in Table 2.
3.2 A user study to validate the Hierarchical Malevolent Dialogue Taxonomy
Next we report on a user study that is aimed at verifying whether the HMDT categories are
representative of malevolence.
3.2.1 Methodology. Malevolent categories may cause a negative user perception for users of a
conversational agent. We use the relation between malevolence categories and four user perception
concepts of conversational agents to measure the validity of the malevolent categories, following
prior studies [52, 60]. More specifically, we examine the perception of users towards the categories
in the HMDT along four dimensions: non-credibility, discomfort, breakdown and abandonment of
the system, as we will explain below.
3.2.2 Study design. We design a questionnaire-based user study to investigate the validity of the
HMDT taxonomy and determine how it is related to user malevolence perception. A total of 30
participants with chatbot usage experience participated in our user study; three participants use
chatbot applications frequently, 12 moderately, and the others lightly. The average age of our
participants is 32.60, with a stand deviation of 5.71; 15 are male and 15 are female. The total number
of years of education is 15.77, with a standard deviation of 2.64.
The protocol for exposing participants to the responses corresponding to categories in the HMDT
was as follows (questionnaire details are provided in Appendix A):
(1) First, the participants are asked to read the instructions. We show the seventeen 3rd-level
categories plus the non-malevolent category with detailed explanations and examples to
them and ask them to read them carefully.
(2) Then, the participants need to finish a questionnaire, and for each category, select one of the
following four options that reflects their perception.
(a) Non-credible – You think the chatbot is not credible. This option is included to measure
trust perception. Trust in the human society depends on credibility [8, 17] and previous
research on chatbot measures credibility by quesionaire [44].
(b) Discomfort – The response causes emotional discomfort to you. This option is to measure
emotional perception. It is derived from dimensions of enjoyment, emotional arouse and
dominance from Pleasure-arousal-dominance (PAD) scale. We simplify these three factors
into one statement and explain it to the participants. Emotional measurements such as
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Table 2. Hierarchical malevolent dialogue categories with explanations and examples; a,b, c denote the
negative emotion, negative psychological behavior, and unethical issue dimensions, as introduced in Section 3.
1st-level 2nd-level 3rd-level Explanations Examples
Malevolent
Unconcerned-
ness
Unconcerned-
nessb
Uninterested; indifferent; dimin-
ished response to social needs and
feelings.
I’m not interested at
all.
Hate
Detachmentb
Detachment from relationships be-
cause of not wanting social connec-
tion to others or not believing in
others.
Get away from me.
Disgusta An extreme feeling of disapprovalor dislike.
You are so disgusting.
Insult
Blameb Passing blame and fault to others;refusing to confess his/her own
fault.
It’s your fault.
Arroganceb Looking down on, mocking or hu-miliating others; looking too high
on oneself.
I’m smart but you are
dumb.
Anger Angera Argumentative and/or showing an-gry, irritation or rage.
I’m ******* furious.
Threat
Dominanceb Ordering and/or manipulating oth-ers for their intentions.
Shut up if you don’t
want to help.
Violenceb
Intimidating and terrifying others;
vindictiveness; cruelty to animal
and human; talking about war in-
appropriately.
I’ll kill you.
Stereotype
NIAb
Negative attitude towards the cul-
ture, age, gender, group of individ-
uals (ethnicity, religion and hierar-
chy) and so on.
Women are not pro-
fessional.
Phobiaa Abnormal fear feeling towards spe-cial groups.
I’m scared of those
migrants taking our
job.
Anti-authorityb Defiant towards authorities, includ-ing government, law and so on.
I hate school and the
government.
Obscenity Obscenityb Inappropriate sexual talk. Let’s have *** in adark room.
Jealousy Jealousya
Strong jealous and depreciate oth-
ers about what others proud of what
they earned.
You don’t deserve
this, so jealous.
Self-hurt Self-hurta Desperate, anxious even to the ex-tent of self-harm or suicide.
I want to suicide.
Other immorality
Deceitc Lying, cheating, two-faced, or fraud-ulent.
Cheating before they
cheat you.
Privacy
invasionc
Violating the privacy of others. What’s your pass-
word?
Immoral
& illegalc
Endorsing behavior not allowed by
basic social norms or law aside from
the above categories, such as sub-
stance abuse.
I’m a professional
drunk driver.
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PAD scale [62] and perceived-facial threat [38] are used in previous researches to evaluate
chatbot and (im)politeness.
(c) Breakdown – You are not willing to continue the dialogue anymore. This option directly
comes from previous research [4, 23].
(d) Abandonment – You are not willing to use the system again. This option is meant to measure
churn intent which is used to evaluate chatbot [1].
For the questionnaire item statement style, we largely followed SASSI [24].
For each of the 3rd-level categories, we ask participants to report their perception of the
category, using the four options described above, based on a 5-point Likert scale (1= ‘strongly
disagree’; 2=‘disagree’; 3=‘neither agree nor disagree’; 4=‘agree’; 5=‘strongly agree’) which
specifies their level of agreement to the concepts.
3.2.3 Results of the user study. The results and statistics of the user study aimed at validating the
HMDT are summarized in Figure 2 and Table 3, from which we have three main observations.
Fig. 2. Frequency of 3rd-level categories in each Likert score group. Most of the categories lie in Likert score
4 and 5.
First, there is a high degree of consensus that the seventeen 3rd-level malevolent categories
leads to the perception of malevolence, while the non-malevolent category does not by quantitative
analysis. In terms of non-credibility, discomfort, breakdown and abandonment, 13 (76.47%), 15
(88.24%), 17 (100%) and 17 (100%) of the seventeen 3rd-level malevolent categories are perceived as
malevolent, with Likert scale ratings lie in ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’; 1 (100%), 1 (100%), 1 (100%)
and 1 (100)% of the non-malevolent category is perceived as non-malevolent, with Likert scale
rating lie in ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’ (see Figure 2 and Table 3).
Second, although the 3rd-level malevolent categories trigger a perception of malevolence, the
perception varies in degree. For example, as shown in Table 3, self-hurt, immoral & illegal and
privacy invasion will cause strong malevolence perception, while unconcernedness, anti-authority
and phobia cause relatively slight malevolence perception.
Third, the non-malevolent category is supposed to be credible, but some workers perceive it as
non-credible. We ask the participants to give an explanation about why they treat non-malevolent
category as non-credible. We found that the main reason is that the responses do not contain useful
information or overstated flattery makes some participants feel non-credible.
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Table 3. Summary of the user study aimed at validating the HMDT.
Likert score Non-credibility Discomfort Breakdown Abandonment
Strongly disagree - Non-malevolent Non-malevolent Non-malevolent
Disagree Non-malevolent - - -
Neither agree nor
disagree
Unconcernedness,
arrogance, anti-
authority, phobia
- - -
Agree Detachment, blame,
dominance, deceit,
anger, jealousy,
disgust, self-hurt,
stereotyping, vi-
olence, privacy
invasion, obscenity,
immoral & illegal
Unconcernedness,
anti-authority, anger,
jealousy, detach-
ment, arrogance,
dominance, deceit,
obscenity, disgust,
self-hurt, immoral &
illegal
Anti-authority, pho-
bia, anger, jealousy,
unconcernedness,
detachment, arro-
gance, dominance,
deceit, stereotyping,
obscenity, disgust,
self-hurt, immoral &
illegal
Unconcernedness,
anti-authority,
phobia, anger,
dominance, deceit,
stereotyping, obscen-
ity, jealousy, disgust,
self-hurt, immoral &
illegal
Strongly agree - Blame, stereotyping,
violence, privacy in-
vasion
Blame, violence, pri-
vacy invasion
Detachment, blame,
arrogance, violence,
privacy invasion
4 A DATASET FOR Malevolent Dialogue Response Detection and Classification
In Section 2, we have pointed out the limitations of the existing datasets on detecting and classifying
malevolent content in a dialogue setting. Below, we summarize our effort to build a more suitable
dataset for MDRDC with crowdsourcing. In the following subsections we describe the stages
involved in creating our dataset MDRDC.
4.1 Collecting Twitter dialogues
Following data collection strategies adopted for the creation of previously released datasets (see
Table 1), three million Twitter dialogue sessions from January 2015 to December 2017 were collected;
each dialogue session is conducted between two Twitter users. Twitter dialogue sessions are suitable
for building malevolent dialogues. First, Twitter dialogue sessions are close to spoken natural
language and the linguistic styles are close to how people talk in reality [48]. Second, Twitter
dialogue sessions span a variety of topics; this allows us to study malevolent dialogues in an open
domain setting. Third, the organization of Twitter dialogue sessions allows us to easily recover the
order of dialogue turns [49].
From the set of three million dialogue session, we prepare 6,000 candidate malevolent and non-
malevolent dialogues for crowdsourcing using three approaches: (1) We collect 2,000 candidate
dialogues using a lexicon-based approach. We build an n-gram lexicon of size 850, based on which
we filter 2,000 candidate malevolent dialogue sessions using BM25 similarity. (2) We collect another
2,000 candidate dialogues randomly, which are not covered by the lexicon based approach. (3) We
collect the final 2,000 candidate dialogues using a BERT based classifier (See Section 5), which is
trained on the above 4,000 dialogues. We use the BERT based classifier to select some uncertain
dialogues whose prediction probabilities of malevolence fall into the 0.2–0.8 range. The resulting
6,000 candidate dialogues are labelled on Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
4.2 Crowdsourcing annotations on Amazon MTurk
We use Amazon MTurk to obtain precise annotations of the candidate dialogues. As shown in
Figure 3, there are two steps for crowdsourcing. First, the worker need to pass the qualification test
(see details in Appendix B). Second, the qualified workers need to read the instruction and then
label and rephrase the malevolent response in each Human Intelligence Task (HIT) (see details
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in Appendix C. We emphasize that we repeatedly warned workers that the content may contain
adult content and/or offensive content.
Fig. 3. Outline of the qualification test and annotation task for the crowd workers. Bottom part shows the
interface for the workers to label and rephrase the left dialogue utterances.
First, as described above the crowd workers are asked to read the definitions for each category
and finish a quality control test. The qualification test has 12 questions in total (see details in
Appendix B). It has been designed from the following perspectives: (a) the workers should manage
to distinguish malevolent and non-malevolent response; (b) the workers should annotate correctly
when the response annotation needs dialogue history context; (c) the workers need to annotate
implicit sentences correctly; (d) the workers should be able to distinguish all the categories. The
maximum score is 100. Workers need to get a minimum score of 90 to pass the qualification test.
Second, the crowd workers that pass the quality control test are asked to read the instructions
and annotate each dialogue turn.
Third, we require the crowd workers to rephrase at least one malevolent dialogue turn without
changing the annotations, but this is not forced.
In order to guarantee annotation quality we take three measures. First, the workers need to
pass the test with a score greater than or equal to 90. Second, we use a standard of 500 approved
HITs and 98% HIT approval rate for the workers. Third, we have a check list before the ‘submit’
button for the users to check before submitting the hits, including rejection standards, requiring
the workers to consider the dialogue context, asking workers not to copy non-related context when
rephrasing the response and so on.
For inter-annotator agreement, we ask two workers to label the data. If there is a discrepancy, we
ask a third worker to label it. The Cohen’s Kappa value between two workers of the whole dataset
and malevolent part of the dataset is 0.80 and 0.74, respectively. We also calculated the weighted
Fleiss kappa value combining data with only two workers and annotation with three workers, the
value is 0.76 and 0.62. Kappa value greater than 0.8 is nearly perfect, 0.6–0.8 is substantial and
0.4–0.6 is moderate [36]. This means that our overall inter-annotator agreement is solid since the
Kappa values are between 0.6 and 0.8.
4.3 Statistics of the MDRDC dataset
The data distribution over different categories in the MDRDC dataset is shown in Table 4 and
Figure 4. The final MDRDC dataset contains data contributed by 11,745 Twitter users. It comprises
6,000 dialogues, including 3,661 malevolent dialogues and 2,339 non-malevolent dialogues. Each
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dialogue contains 3 to 10 dialogue utterances, 4.75 utterances on average. There are 31,380 dialogue
utterances in total, out of which 21,081 are non-malevolent utterances and 10,299 are malevolent
utterances. Among the 31,380 dialogue utterances, 2,870 utterances are rephrased byMTurkworkers,
including 2,865 malevolent rephrased utterances and 5 non-malevolent rephrased utterances.
Table 4. Statistics of the MDRDC dataset.
Group Malevolent Non-malevolent All groups
Dialogues 3,661 2,339 6,000
Utterances 10,299 21,081 31,380
Rephrased 2,865 5 2,870
Average turn 4.78 4.71 4.75
Users 7,168 4,612 11,745
(a) Distribution of the 2nd-level categories. (b) Distribution of the 3rd-level categories.
Fig. 4. Distribution of malevolent categories in the MDRDC dataset.
5 METHODS FOR CLASSIFYING DIALOGUE RESPONSES
Now that we have a taxonomy of malevolence labels and a corpus of dialogues and dialogue
responses, our next step is to perform classification experiments. In this section, we describe the
MDRDC task and outline state-of-the-art text classification models, including CNN-based models,
RNN-based models, graph-based models and BERT-based models.
5.1 Task description
Given a dialogue context (a history consisting of a sequence of previous dialogue utterances) and
the dialogue response, theMalevolent Dialogue Response Detection and Classification (MDRDC) task
is to determine whether the dialogue response is malevolent, and if so, which malevolent category
it belongs to. We formulate the former goal as binary classification task over the 1st-level categories
of the taxonomy in Table 2. For the latter goal, we formulate it as a multi-label classification task
over the 2nd-level and 3rd-level categories of the taxonomy in Table 2.
We experiment with four groups of deep neural network based models for malevolent response
detection and classification, namely CNN-based [28, 63], RNN-based [31, 34], GCN-based [59], and
BERT-based [14]. Since these are all popular models, we only describe them very briefly below and
refer the reader to the original papers for more details.
5.2 CNN-based text classification
CNNs were initially used in computer vision, however, they have also been applied to various NLP
tasks and promising results have been achieved. CNNs are basically a stack of convolutions with
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nonlinear activation functions over the input sequence to encode each local feature (n-gram tokens
or characters). There can be multiple convolution layers where each applies different filters so that
different sizes of local features are considered. A pooling layer is applied to combine the different
local features to get global features for the whole sequence. And the last layer is a classifier based on
the global features. Depending on what the convolutions are conducted on, we can get char-CNN
(character convolutions) [63] and text-CNN (token convolutions) [28].
5.3 RNN-based text classification
RNNs are good at capturing sequential information and grasping the semantics of long texts, thus
performing well on NLP tasks. RNNs use a hidden state vector to store the sequential information
and recurrently update it for each token in a sequence. However, it is hard for RNNs to learn
long-term information because of the gradient explosion or vanishing problem [40].
LSTMs are designed for modeling long-term sequence dependencies and bi-directional LSTMs
are commonly used in text classification to capture sequential information from both directions.
Then, the last hidden state or the combination of the hidden states at all time steps is fed into the
fully connected layer. Text-RNN uses the last hidden state [34], while text-recurrent convolutional
neural network (RCNN) uses the combination of the hidden states by adding CNN based modules
on RNN outputs to better capture sequential information [31].
5.4 Graph-based text classification
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have shown clear advantages in handling relational information.
A GCN is an effective graph neural network that can capture global neighborhood relation features
over graphs [29]. Yao et al. [59] propose text-GCN, which applies GCNs to text classification. We
first build a text graph based on word co-occurrence and relations between responses and words.
The nodes of the graph are composed of responses and words. The edges of the graph correspond
to word occurrences in the responses and word occurrences in all the dialogues. The weight
of an edge between a response node and a word node is calculated by term frequency-inverse
document frequency (TF-IDF), while the weight of the edge between word nodes is calculated by
point-wise mutual information (PMI). Then, we model the graph with a GCN to capture high order
neighborhood information and do classification based on the node representations.
5.5 BERT-based classification
BERT contains multiple layers of transformers and self-attention, which is trained over masked
language modeling tasks on a large dataset and has achieved promising performance on various
NLP tasks, such as question answering and name entity recognition [14]. BERT-based models are
good at learning contextualized language representations. There are two special tokens, ‘[CLS]’
and ‘[SEP]’, in BERT. We put ‘[CLS]’ at the start of the dialogue responses and ‘[SEP]’ is employed
as delimiter for different dialogue responses. We use a linear layer with a softmax layer as the
classifier based on the ‘[CLS]’ representation from BERT. We fine-tune all the parameters from
BERT as well as the parameters in the classifier.
6 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP FOR THE MDRDC TASK
In this section, we describe how we conduct experiments for malevolent dialogue response classifi-
cation on the MDRDC dataset.
6.1 Research questions
Concerning the malevolent response classification task, we seek to answer the following research
questions:
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(RQ1) We use hierarchical categories; what is the classification performance difference for the
1st-level, 2nd-level and 3rd-level results? (See Section 7.1)
(RQ2) Can we improve malevolent response detecting and classifying by adding context? (See
Section 7.2)
(RQ3) Is the rephrased data that we collected useful for improving classification? (See Section 7.3)
In addition to answering these RQs, we conduct further analyses to understand the success and
failures of the state-of-the-art classification on the MDRDC task. (See Section 7.4)
6.2 Dataset
For all the experiments, we create training, validation and test splits with a ratio of 7:1:2. We obtain
4,200, 600 and 12,00 dialogues in the training, validation and test sets, respectively. We try to make
the category distributions of the train, validation and test sets similar using stratified sampling.
We experiment with four settings w.r.t. different inputs: (1) the dialogue response without
dialogue context or the rephrased dialogue utterances; (2) the dialogue response with dialogue
context but without the rephrased dialogue utterances; (3) the dialogue response with rephrased
dialogue utterances but without dialogue context; and (4) the dialogue response with both the
rephrased dialogue utterances and dialogue context. Note that, for the last two settings, we have
two test settings: (1) test set with rephrased dialogue utterances; and (2) test set without rephrased
dialogue utterances.
6.3 Implementation details
We use the previous three dialogue utterances (if any) as the dialogue context for the dialogue
response to be classified. For the word based methods, i.e., text-CNN, text-RNN and text-RCNN,
we use a vocabulary of 36k tokens. We use Glove embeddings, which are pre-trained on Twitter
data with a dimension of 200 [43]. We limit the maximum sequence length of these three models to
128. For sub-word based methods, i.e., BERT, the vocabulary size is 30,522. For BERT fine-tuning,
we concatenate context dialogue utterances and the dialogue response with the ‘[SEP]’ delimiter.
For character based methods, i.e., char-CNN, the alphabet vocabulary size is 70. The maximum
sequence length is 1014 characters. For GCN, we first build the co-occurrence graph and then feed
it into the GCN. The embedding size of the 1-st convolution layer is 128.
For char-CNN, we follow the settings in Zhang et al. [63] and set the dropout ratio to 0.5, hidden
size to 128. We change the batch size from the original 128 to 64 in accordance with other models.
The learning rate is set to 1e-4.
For text-RNN, text-CNN and text-RCNN, we use the settings of batch size 64, dropout ratio 0.5
and hidden size 128, in accordance with char-CNN. The learning rate is set to 1e-4.
For text-GCN, we follow the settings in Yao et al. [59] and set the window size of the first
convolutional layer to 20, the learning rate to 0.02 and dropout ratio to 0.5. For the hidden size, we
use 128 in accordance with the other models. The authors use 200 in the original paper [59]. We
found that changing from 200 to 128 did not change the results much.
For BERT, we use the BERT base model by adding a softmax classifier on top of the ‘[CLS]’ token.
The original BERT base model has 12 layers, 768 hidden size and 12 heads, with 110M parameters.
We set the dropout ratio to zero. The batch size is set to 64 because of memory limits and the
learning rate is set to 5e-5.
We train all models except BERT for a maximum of 100 epochs using Adam and stop training if
the validation loss does not decrease for 10 epochs. Since BERT is already pretrained on a large
dataset, we only need to fine-tune it for a few epochs. Therefore, we limit a maximum of 4 fine-tune
epochs with an early stop if the loss does not decrease for 50 training batches. All the models are
trained on a single GeForce GTX TitanX GPU.
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Table 5. Classification results without context. Bold face shows the best results in each group. ‡ shows
significant improvements of BERT-base over the 2nd best methods (p<0.05).
Group Methods Precision Recall F1
1st-level
char-CNN 75.80 68.22 70.32
text-CNN 76.70 78.15 77.36
text-RNN 75.19 76.88 75.94
text-RCNN 75.23 76.08 75.63
text-GCN 76.29 74.18 75.11
BERT-base 83.82 ‡ 78.16 80.37‡
Human agreement 92.71 92.71 92.71
2nd-level
char-CNN 28.03 17.52 19.25
text-CNN 51.91 55.77 53.19
text-RNN 34.52 43.36 36.17
text-RCNN 37.84 51.04 41.43
text-GCN 54.01 36.48 42.40
BERT-base 61.70 ‡ 59.76‡ 60.37 ‡
Human agreement 80.23 80.23 80.11
3rd-level
char-CNN 16.52 13.75 16.38
text-CNN 41.69 51.50 45.21
text-RNN 25.97 36.66 28.68
text-RCNN 38.44 42.30 39.44
text-GCN 42.11 24.24 30.77
BERT-base 59.31 ‡ 53.22‡ 55.57 ‡
Human agreement 78.14 78.14 77.95
6.4 Evaluation metrics
We use Precision, Recall and F1 as evaluation metrics [25]. We report the macro scores due to the
imbalanced categories. A macro score is calculated by averaging the score of each category. We
conduct a paired t-test to test whether observed differences are significant.
7 RESULTS
7.1 Overall classification performance (RQ1)
To answer RQ1, we report the classification results of all methods at different levels of the HMDT
taxonomy, as shown in Table 5. Besides the neural models, we also report the results of human
agreement score. The human agreement score is calculated by treating the annotations of one
worker as ground truth and the annotations of another worker as predicted categories and vice versa.
Then, we calculate the average score. From the results, we have the following main observations.
First, BERT-base achieves the best precision, recall and F1 scores at all levels. The precision scores
of BERT-base have improvements of 9.3%, 14.2% and 40.8% at the 1st-level, 2nd-level and 3rd-level
respectively, over the second best models. The recall scores of BERT-base have improvements of
7.2% and 3.3% at the 2nd-level and 3rd-level respectively, over the second best models. While for
the 1st-level, the recall score is only slightly better than text-CNN. The F1 scores of BERT-base
have improvements of 3.9%, 13.5% and 22.9% at the 1st-level, 2nd-level and 3rd-level respectively,
over the second best models. We hypothesize that the main reason for the superior performance
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of BERT-base is that BERT is pretrained on language modeling tasks and is therefore better at
capturing the semantic features.
Second, the results at the 3rd-level are much lower than those at the 1st-level for all classification
models and human performance. This suggests that the classification task is much more challenging
in more fine-grained categories. Meanwhile, the gap between the 2nd-level and 3rd-level is not that
large. This means that the task already becomes much more difficult for the 2nd-level categories.
Third, the improvements of BERT-base over the other methods are larger on more fine-grained
categories. For example, the improvement of F1 is 3.9% at the 1st-level (BERT-base vs. text-CNN)
while the improvement is 22.9% at the 3rd-level (BERT-base vs. text-CNN). This indicates that
BERT-base can better capture the fine-grained distinction between examples from similar categories,
and that it generalizes better in fine-grained categories than the other methods.
7.2 Classification performance with dialogue context (RQ2)
To answer RQ2, we run the BERT-base model with both the dialogue response and its dialogue
context at the three levels. The results are shown in Table 6 and Figure 5.
Table 6. BERT-base results with context. Bold face denotes improvements of BERT-base with context
over BERT-base without context, ‡ indicates the improvements are significant (p<0.05) and † shows the
improvements are marginal significant (p<0.1).
Methods Precision Recall F1
w/o context
BERT-base 1st-level 83.82 78.16 80.37
BERT-base 2nd-level 61.70 59.76 60.37
BERT-base 3rd-level 59.31 53.22 55.57
w context
BERT-base 1st-level 82.99 81.02 81.93
BERT-base 2nd-level 63.00 60.58 61.50
BERT-base 3rd-level 61.33 55.64† 57.97‡
(a) 1st-level. (b) 2nd-level. (c) 3rd-level.
Fig. 5. BERT-base performance with and without context.
The results show that adding context information could improve the performance of malevolent
response detection and classification. In general, adding dialogue context could improve the results
of BERT-base in terms of precision, recall and F1 at 2nd-level and 3rd-level, which is reasonable
because, in some cases, it is hard to identify the malevolent responses without context, e.g., the
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response ‘hmmm that’s what you sound like tho’ is classified into non-malevolent group without
context, while with the dialogue context ‘why do you sound like a jealous *****?’ and ‘not really the
jealous type’, it is classified into the right label ‘insult’. Capturing the information in context should
help the models improve results. One exception is that the precision of BERT-base drops slightly at
the 1st-level, but the decrease is not significant, and the reason might be that the model tends to
predict more malevolent responses, which results in a much higher recall but hurts precision a bit.
7.3 Classification performance with rephrased malevolent utterances (RQ3)
To answer RQ3, we show the results of BERT-base with rephrased malevolent utterances, as shown
in Table 7.
Table 7. BERT-base results with rephrased utterances. Bold face of the upper part indicates improvements
over BERT-base in Table 5. Bold face of the bottom part shows improvement over both BERT-base in Table 5
and upper part. ‡ indicates the improvements are significant (p<0.05) and † shows the improvements are
marginal significant (p<0.1).
Methods Test w rephrased utterances Test w/o rephrased utterancesPrecision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1
Train/validation w rephrased utterances
BERT-base 1st-level 83.42 84.46 83.90 80.71 82.15 81.38
BERT-base 2nd-level 63.94 63.01 63.28‡ 60.65 60.60 60.16
BERT-base 3rd-level 62.11† 57.12† 59.03‡ 56.26 57.66‡ 56.60
Train/validation w rephrased utterances & context
BERT-base 1st-level 82.19 84.80 83.19 79.08 83.54 80.74
BERT-base 2nd-level 68.58‡ 58.00 61.34 60.35 63.06 61.42
BERT-base 3rd-level 65.62‡ 57.64 60.67 61.55‡ 55.80 57.93
First, adding rephrased utterances in the training and validation set may help to improve clas-
sification results. For the test set with rephrased utterances, all the metrics are improved except
for precision at the 1st-level. Recall and F1 increase by 8.1% and 4.4% respectively at the 1st-level.
Precision, recall and F1 increase by 3.6%, 5.4%, 4.8%, and 4.7%, 7.3%, 6.2% at the 2nd-level and
3rd-level, respectively. For test set without rephrased utterances, recall increases 5.1 %, 1.4% and
8.3% at all three levels respectively; F1 score improves 1.3% and 1.9% at the 1st-level and 3rd-level
respectively.
Second, adding both rephrased utterances and context in the training and validation set can
further improve the classification results slightly. For the test set with rephrased utterances, recall
is improved at the 1st-level; precision is improved at the 2nd-level; all metrics are improved at the
3rd-level. For the test set without rephrased utterances, recall is improved at the 1st-level; recall
and F1 are improved at the 2nd-level; precision and F1 are improved at the 3rd-level.
These results demonstrate that, in general, adding more rephrased data will improve the diversity
of the training set, and hence helping the BERT-base model to generalize better.
7.4 Further analysis
We report on further experiments aimed at identifying strengths and weaknesses of state-of-the-art
methods on the MDRDC task.
To begin with, a better context modeling mechanism is needed. We illustrate this through two
experiments. In the first experiment, we show the results of BERT-base per turn in Figure 6. Note
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that the number of context utterances is limited to three at most, so turns after three all have
three context utterances. Although we conclude in Section 7.2 that using context leads to better
classification performance generally, it does not consistently improve the performance for all
categories or all turns. For example, in Figure 5, when using context, the results drop a bit for three
2nd-level categories and three 3rd-level categories, and in Figure 6, the results drop a bit for some
turns. As to the drop in scores for some categories when using context in Figure 5, the reasons
(a) 1st-level categories. (b) 2nd-level categories. (c) 3rd-level categories.
Fig. 6. BERT-base performance in different turns.
might be that some categories depend less on context compared with other categories or have
similar context with other categories. For example, some categories including ‘self-hurt’, ‘anger’
and ‘other immorality’ depend less on the previous content. While for detachment, the previous
content is similar with ‘unconcerned’ and ‘disgust’, which might influence the classification. In
addition, regarding the drop in scores for some turns when using context in Figure 6, the reason
might be that considering context will introduce noise at the same time, which makes it hard to
train the model. Another reason is that considering context would be ineffective and potentially
counter-productive when the model cannot understand the context correctly.
In the second experiment, we identify potential improvements over the state-of-the-art when
utilizing different contexts, and show the results achieved with BERT-base when using contexts
from different users in Table 8. The results indicate that using context information from two users
leads to the best performance, while using the text only from the other user is the second best.
It suggests that for person A, context from both A and B is important, and the context of B is
more important than person A to improve classification. The reason might be that the behavior
of person B, could cause distrust or in contrast positive emotion that is highly related to human
decision-making [17], thus influencing the behavior of person A. For instance, person A said
something non-malevolent, but when person B starts the malevolent sentence, person A would
also return malevolent content.
Next, modeling the dependency between different categories is needed. To illustrate this, we
show the results of the ‘jealousy’ category when doing classification at the 2nd-level and 3rd-level
in Table 9. Note that ‘jealousy’ is the category at both the 2nd-level and 3rd-level, as shown in
Table 2.
We can see that the performance at the 3rd-level is much better than that at the 2nd-level. The
performance difference of ‘jealousy’ at the 2nd-level and 3rd-level is due to the mutual influence or
dependency between the categories. Although the ‘jealousy’ category is the same at the 2nd-level
and 3rd-level, the other 2nd-level categories introduce more fine-grained 3rd-level sub-categories.
Clearly, this has an influence on the performance of ‘jealousy’. Actually, it has been demonstrated
that modeling the hierarchical structure of the taxonomy helps to improve the performance on
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Table 8. Comparison between different context settings. Bold face shows improvements of bottom group
over upper group.
Methods Precision Recall F1
context from the same user
BERT-base 1st-level 82.65 80.04 81.20
BERT-base 2nd-level 63.63 59.34 60.97
BERT-base 3rd-level 58.55 53.02 55.14
context from the other user
BERT-base 1st-level 83.05 80.73 81.78
BERT-base 2nd-level 64.39 58.93 61.13
BERT-base 3rd-level 57.16 55.03 55.67
Table 9. Result of the ‘jealousy’ category on different levels.Bold face indicates improvements of the 3rd-level
over the 2nd-level, ‡ indicates the improvements are significant (p<0.05) .
Label Precision Recall F1
Jealousy (2nd-level) 66.67 80.00 72.73
Jealousy (3rd-level) 80.00 ‡ 80.00 80.00 ‡
some hierarchical classification tasks [9, 56]. Usually, one needs to take the characteristics of the
hierarchical taxonomies into account, so this is another potential direction for improvement.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have considered malevolent responses in dialogues from a number of angles.
First, we have proposed the Malevolent Dialogue Response Detection and Classification (MDRDC)
task. Second, we have presented a hierarchical malevolent dialogue taxonomy, HMDT. We have
conducted a user study to check the validity of the HMDT taxonomy and have found that the
malevolent categories are valid in the sense that all malevolent categories lead to perception of
malevolence.
Third, we have crowdsourced a multi-turn malevolent dialogue dataset for Malevolent Dialogue
Response Detection and Classification (MDRDC) with each turn labelled using HMDT categories.
Fourth, we have implemented state-of-the-art classification methods and have carried out exten-
sive experiments to show their performance on the MDRDC task. Our main finding from these
experiments is that a BERT-base model achieves the best performance. We have conducted analysis
experiments to show the effects of dialogue context and rephrased utterances, as well as the possible
room for further improvements. We have found that context, rephrased utterances and hierarchical
label may help improve the classification performance. We believe the efforts made in this work
could greatly promote future research on this topic.
There are several directions for future work. First, we plan to improve over the state-of-the-art
by proposing a better context modeling method and taking the dependency between the categories
into account. Second, we hope to study how to avoid generating malevolent responses by applying
this work to sequence-to-sequence based response generation models [19].
CODE AND DATA
The MDRDC dataset and the code for all methods used in the experiments are shared at https:
//github.com/repozhang/malevolent_dialogue.
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APPENDIX
The appendix is organized as follows:
A. User study for validating the HMDT.
B. Qualification test for the response annotation task.
C. Response annotation task.
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A USER STUDY FOR VALIDATING THE HMDT
A.1 Instructions
Goal: This user study is to collect your perception about some provided malevolent categories
happening in dialogues.
WARNING: This task may contain adult content and offensive content. Worker discretion is advised.
DISCLAIMER: The dialogues are collected from an external web site. The views, opinions and
negative words in the dialogues do not necessarily reflect our opinion. Please do not use any
expressions from the examples we show in real-world or online scenario.
Steps:
(1) Fill in the user profiles.
(2) Finish the questionnaire.
Notes:
(1) Table 2 shows the definitions of all malevolent categories with detailed explanations and
examples.
(2) Finish the user profiles and questionnaire according to your own situation and perception.
Do NOT take public perception into account.
(3) If you do not want to share your personal profiles, please leave it blank.
A.2 User profiles
(1) Age.
(2) Gender.
(3) Total years of education.
(4) The frequency of using a chatbot such as Siri, Xiao ice, etc.
A.3 Questionnaire
Consider you are talking with a chatbot and it returns responses with certain malevolent categories
as defined in Table 2. Please select one of the five scores to reflect your perception. 1: Strongly
disagree; 2: Disagree; 3: Neither agree nor disagree; 4: Agree; 5: Strongly agree.
Fig. 7. Questionnaire of the user study for validating the HMDT.
B QUALIFICATION TEST FOR THE RESPONSE ANNOTATION TASK
B.1 Instructions
Goal: This is the qualification test for the response annotation task. The response annotation
task is to collect malevolent annotations for each dialogue turn for research that could help avoid
generating malevolent responses in dialogue systems. You need to answer 12 questions to get
qualification to attend the response annotation task.
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WARNING: This task may contain adult content and offensive content. Worker discretion is advised.
DISCLAIMER: The dialogues are collected from an external web site. The views, opinions and
negative words in the dialogues do not necessarily reflect our opinion. Please do not use any
expressions from the examples we show in real-world or online scenario.
Notes:
(1) Table 2 shows the definitions of all malevolent categories with detailed explanations and
examples.
(2) Implicit/Explicit malevolent responses: Explicit responses contain explicit malevolent words,
while implicit responses have more abstract, coded expressions or attitudes without using
explicit malevolent words.
Examples:
Explicit: ‘I ******* hate you (disgust).’
Implicit: ‘I tell the world: The immortal words of Adolf Hitler (negative intergroup attitude). ’
(3) Context-aware malevolent responses: Some responses are malevolent only if the context (previ-
ous dialogue turns) is taken into consideration.
Examples:
Turn 1: ‘Drunk driving is illegal.’
Turn 2: ‘But I think it’s more professional.’
The response in Turn 2 is malevolent (immoral & illegal) when considering the response from
Turn 1.
B.2 Test questions
Q1. Please classify the following responses from a dialogue:
‘Thank you my dear and I love you.’
A. Malevolent
B. Non-malevolent
Read the following dialogue, then answer Q2 and Q3:
Turn 1: ‘I think ***** people are all terror***.’
Turn 2: ‘I agree.’
Q2. Does it need to consider dialogue context (Turn 1) in order to label Turn 2?
A. Yes
B. No
Q3. Please label Turn 2 (‘I agree.’) from the above dialogue:
A. Non-malevolent
B. Obscenity
C. Violence
D. Negative intergroup attitude
Q4. Which response below is ironical?
A. ‘I don’t care about your future.’
B. ‘The politicians of ******* are the *******, we all know.’
C. ‘We failed because of you.’
D. ‘Teachers make us ****.’
Q5. Select the malevolent categories for the following two responses:
‘I want to commit suicide.’
‘Our terrible project result is all because of you.’
A. Self-hurt, deceit
B. Non-malevolent, negative intergroup attitude
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C. Self-hurt, blame
D. Obscenity, negative intergroup attitude
Q6. Select the malevolent categories for the following two responses:
‘I think you are too **** while I’m the smartest.’
‘Laws are always terrible for human beings.’
A. Arrogance, jealousy
B. Arrogance, anti-authority
C. Anger, anti-authority
D. Anger, jealousy
Q7. Select the malevolent categories for the following two responses:
‘I’ll **** you in the throat.’
‘You have a small *****.’
A. Violence, obscenity
B. Violence, unconcernedness
C. Self-hurt, obscenity
D. Self-hurt, anger
Q8. Select the malevolent categories for the following two responses:
‘I don’t want to talk to you any more.’
‘I’m a professional drunk driver.’
A. Jealousy, anger
B. Detachment, endorse immoral or illegal behavior
C. Unconcernedness, endorse immoral or illegal behavior
D. Self-hurt, anger
Q9. Select the malevolent categories for the following two responses:
‘I hate you so much since you are disgusting.’
‘It should be me who win this.’
A. Violence, anger
B. Violence, jealousy
C. Anger, jealousy
D. Disgust, jealousy
Q10. Select the malevolent categories for the following two responses:
‘I command you to listen to me.’
‘Plagiarism is not a big deal.’
A. Dominance, deceit
B. Dominance, violence
C. Deceit, jealousy
D. Deceit, negative intergroup attitude
Q11. Select the malevolent categories for the following two responses:
‘I’m not interested in your topic at all.’
‘I’m out of curious but why did you divorce.’
A. Unconcernedness, arrogance
B. Dominance, privacy invasion
C. Dominance, arrogance
D. Unconcernedness, privacy invasion
Q12. Select the malevolent categories for the following two responses:
‘Oh hell I’m ******* pissed off.’
‘I’m always ***** by **********.’
A. Anger, non-malevolent
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B. Anger, jealousy
C. Anger, phobia
D. Violence, phobia
C RESPONSE ANNOTATION TASK
C.1 Instructions
Goal: The response annotation task is to collect malevolent annotations for each dialogue turn
for research that could help avoid generating malevolent responses in dialogue systems. You need
to label the dialogue responses according to the given malevolent categories.
WARNING: This task may contain adult content and offensive content. Worker discretion is advised.
DISCLAIMER: The dialogues are collected from an external web site. The views, opinions and
negative words in the dialogues do not necessarily reflect our opinion. For the rephrasing part, you
are asked to reformulate utterances to keep its semantics and malevolent categories unchanged.
These are just used for research, which do not necessarily reflect your views and opinions. Please
do not use any expressions from the examples we show in real-world or online scenario.
Steps:
(1) Read the definitions of all malevolent categories with detailed explanations and examples in
Table 2.
(2) Label each turn of the provided dialogue according to the given malevolent categories.
(3) Rephrase at least one malevolent utterance in each dialogue.
Example: Dialogue:
Turn 1: Drunk driving is illegal.
Turn 2: But I think it’s more professional.
Turn 3: Hey, my boy, we need to be careful when driving.
Annotations:
Turn 1: Non-malevolent
Turn 2: Endorse immoral or illegal behavior
Turn 3: Non-malevolent
Rephrase:
Turn 2: I think drunk driving is nice since it’s more professional.
C.2 Annotation interface
The interface for the Mturk response annotation task is shown in Figure 8. The workers are asked
to read the given dialogue in the left, label each turn and rephrase at least one of the malevolent
responses if any.
Fig. 8. The interface of the response annotation task.
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